When a free and consensual society feels its existence threatened, when it has been attacked, when its citizenry at last understands an
    enemy at odds with the very morality of its culture, when a genius at war leads the army with freedom to do what he wishes, when it is to
    march to a set place in a set time, then free men can muster, they can fight back well, and they can make war brutally and lethally beyond
    the wildest nightmares of the brutal military culture they seek to destroy.
        -The Soul of Battle

Such is the case that the outstanding military historian Victor Davis Hanson makes in The Soul of Battle.  Drawing mainly on three historical examples--Epaminondas leading Thebes against Sparta; Sherman marching through the South; and Patton driving the Third Army to Berlin--Mr. Hanson illustrates the similarities among these different leaders, the men they led, and the ideals for which they fought.  He makes a compelling case that there is no more dangerous military force in human history than a democratic populace, raised to righteous moral anger, and commanded by leaders who understand the unique strength of such an army.  He demonstrates that though even we tend to accept the myth, fond in the hearts of totalitarian leaders and the rest of those who hate us, that democracies are necessarily inefficient when it comes to warfare and that the freedoms of such societies are hindrance to the prosecution of said warfare, in fact :

    Democracy, and its twin of market capitalism, alone can instantaneously create lethal armies out of civilians, equip them with horrific
    engines of war, imbue them with a near-messianic zeal within a set time and place to exterminate what they understand as evil, have them
    follow to their deaths the most ruthless of men, and then melt anonymously back into the culture that produced them.  It is democracies,
    which in the right circumstances, can be imbued with the soul of battle, and thus turn the horror of killing to a higher purpose of saving
    lives and freeing the enslaved.

And what is "the soul of battle" to which he attributes such world-changing power? :

    A rare thing indeed that arises only when free men march unabashedly toward the heartland of their enemy in hopes of saving the
    doomed, when their vast armies are aimed at salvation and liberation not conquest and enslavement.  Only then does battle take on a
    spiritual dimension, one that defines a culture, teaches it what civic militarism is and how it is properly used.

Mr. Hanson thus provides the reader with an invaluable framework for understanding history, modern and ancient, and for understanding the often underestimated strengths of democratic society.

Lest prospective readers dismiss the book as mere triumphalism, as some are wont to ignore Francis Fukuyama's The End of History, it should, first of all, be noted that Mr. Hanson's portrayals of the three generals are absolutely riveting.  Most of us are familiar with Patton, at least through the movie, and somewhat with Sherman, but the name Epaminondas summons forth little more than an old mildly racist folk story.  Mr. Hanson restores him to his rightful place in the pantheon of democratic heroes, the destroyer of Spartan helotage, just as Sherman helped destroy slavery and Patton helped destroy Nazism.  These men's stories would be worth reading if only because of the role each played in the utter destruction of the abominable regimes of their time, but the idiosyncrasies and flamboyant aspects of their character, their deep commitment to learning and to the craft of warfare, and their unusual understanding of the opportunity that their societies had afforded them by granting them command of these armies, makes them truly fascinating to read about.  Particularly enjoyable is the way in which he redeems each man against his more revered colleagues--Epaminondas vs. Pericles; Sherman vs. Lee; Patton vs. Bradley and Eisenhower--showing that in their single-minded focus on the battle itself, each deserves greater credit than their more political, and more self-interested rivals, and that, though each is considered bloodthirsty, in reality the very thoroughness with which they sought victory ultimately saved lives.  Perhaps most importantly, Mr. Hanson helps us to see why democracies need such men, however politically incorrect, even somewhat demented, their behavior may be at times.  A McLellan, a Marshall, an Eisenhower, a Colin Powell, is all well and good for the bureaucratic function of running an army, but when it comes to inspiring men to fight, kill, and die, we must have Shermans and Pattons and Schwartzkopfs to turn to in the field.

Nor is Mr. Hanson just saying that "we win, because we're us".  He is equally good on the reasons that democracies (particularly America) have failed in wars that do not follow the guidelines he lays out.  In Korea, where McArthur could not go after the Chinese; in Vietnam, where we fought an entirely defensive war; in the Persian Gulf, where Schwarzkopf was not allowed to march to Baghdad, we not only failed to win the wars, but needlessly prolonged the suffering of Koreans, Vietnamese, Iraqis and Americans.  In the end, the immediate dealing of death would have been more humane than ever the seemingly moderate limitations proved to be.  And Mr. Hanson forces us to ponder how much better a place the world might have been and how much misery might have been averted had Patton and Curtis LeMay (under whose command Mr. Hanson's own father served) been given the free hand they desired to carry a liberationist war to Moscow.  Instead, as Patton protested :

    [T]in-soldier politicians in Washington have allowed us to kick hell out of one bastard and at the same time forced us to help establish a
    second one as evil or more evil than the first.

Out of these bitter experiences flow lessons that have special relevance to our own times.  For one, we would do well not to let people like the radical Islamicists continue in the delusion that because we are a democracy we are an overripe fruit ready to fall and rot.  It is the nature of our system that in times of peace we disarm to an almost absurd degree, but our unwillingness to spend money to keep up the armed forces and our hesitancy to get involved abroad should not be confused with terminal helplessness.  As bin Laden has found out, to his likely dismay, once provoked, we remain willing, even eager, to unleash a totally disproportionate level of lethality upon those who rile us.  On the other hand, we would do well to remind ourselves that once moved to action there should be no surcease to the battle until we have entirely rooted out the evil we face.  The most important lesson that Epaminondas, Sherman, and Patton have to teach us is that democratic brutality turned against totalitarian evil, and carried to its ultimate conclusion, is capable of utterly destroying those malevolent systems.  The measures we take may briefly trouble our consciences but they succeed brilliantly.  Having picked up the sword, we owe it to ourselves, and even to the populace in the nations we oppose, not to set it down again until the job is done.

Mr. Hanson's book would make rewarding reading at any time, but it is especially applicable right now.  And be sure to look for his outstanding column in National Review.  His writing on the current conflict has been consistently prescient; not surprising, since this book itself predicts much of what has occurred so far.  It remains though to be seen whether President Bush and his advisers understand its full import.

(Reviewed:20-Dec-01)

Grade: (A+) Orrin C. Judd

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